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What is the difference between a political act and an act of terrorism? 
Why is it that most of us have a strong feeling that these two areas of 
analysis coincide on a level, even if we have difficulty articulating it?2 
Recent feminist work in political theory has often made the point that 
the gender‑based accounts of ethics of past years have something to offer 
political thought, but the area of what is constitutive of terrorism and 
responses to it remains underinvestigated. 
Before beginning an analysis of what might be meant by the phrase 
“terrorism”—and how this would differ from some other political acts—it 
is important to try to spell out the history of feminist concerns for peace. 
Women’s interventions into the peace movement (which itself, at least 
in some guise, is associated with second‑wave feminism) have a lengthy 
history, and it is clear that a great deal of work has been done not only 
on what makes for peace efforts, but what constitutes the very sorts of 
violence and war‑related efforts that drive peace movements in the first 
place. Elise Boulding has written of the history of this work, and she notes:
Between 1820 and 1830, the first all‑women national peace societies were 
1 jduran@education.ucsb.edu
2 For recent work with a general feminist slant on violence in its various ramifications 
and its intersection with other issues, see Women and Violence. eds. Stanley G. French, 
Wanda Teays and Laura Purdy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. For social theory 
and feminism, which is, of course, relevant to these issues, see Brooke Ackerly, Polit-
ical Theory and Feminist Social Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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112 Jane Duran
founded in England and America, and by 1852 the Olive Leaf Circles were 
issuing the first international women’s publication, Sisterly Voices…. By the 
time of the establishment of the short‑lived Paris Commune in 1871 many 
women had apprenticed themselves to the new internationalism….By the 
1880’s and 1890’s, the vision of an international socialist community based on 
non‑violence…was being articulated….3
Although we can trace the trajectory of peace efforts by women, we 
need further information on how women’s thought today interacts with our 
conceptions of terrorism and politically‑inspired activities of violence. We 
need to see how the interstices between these areas work.
1.
Terrorism is best thought of as a network of beliefs that, when 
promulgated and acted upon, attempt to change minds and convert actions 
by way of fear – intense fear. We think of terrorism on a global scale as 
involving attacks on civilians, on modes of travel, and on public places 
that are not ordinarily associated with the military or military endeavors. 
The difficulty with taking a stand on terrorism revolves around the extent 
to which the violence is motivated and planned, and also the extent to 
which it involves issues that themselves may not appear progressive. When 
progressive social issues are pushed forward, in some cases with acts of 
violence, the problematic then becomes one of separating the intent from 
what has occurred, and taking stock of the long‑term goals. 
Some of the lines of argument that have been adduced in this 
context have a great deal to do with the overall concepts of political 
action, demonstration, and response. Our first reaction to the notion that 
examining terrorism as a construct has something to do with the allegedly 
or purportedly non‑violent activities of protest is to maintain that there is 
no link, but a closer examination reveals that we exclude terror largely 
on the basis of a construction of peace‑related activities. Indeed, recent 
work in these areas has revealed that some of what has taken place in the 
U.S. and other developed nations over the past decade or so more or less 
straddles the area between these two extreme and opposing tendencies—an 
example that readily comes to mind is that of the “Occupy” movement. 
If we can demarcate at least two extremes – one involving the obvious 
examples of interfering with air travel, planting bombs or explosives in 
subway and train stations, and executing random attacks on civilians, and 
3  Elise Boulding, Women in the Twentieth Century. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977, 
pp. 169‑70.
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the other more‑or‑less peaceful demonstrations that have gotten out of hand 
– we can come to grips with important notions. For the first set of examples 
involves strategic planning about incidents which involve potential death 
or severe injury; whatever the motivation, we are tempted to think that the 
behavior is morally reprehensible, and that there is no excuse for the acts in 
question. In the second case, the situation becomes much more difficult to 
analyze or use for conceptualization purposes. Certain demonstrations may 
already have a small potential for violence – during the ‘60’s, for example, 
the throwing of rocks and bottles at political demonstrations was a common 
occurrence. The question then becomes one of line‑drawing; once objects 
are thrown, how do we delineate between peaceful demonstration and 
attempted acts of fear and intimidation?
This question would seem to be of most importance for the developed 
nations, since it is clear that the infrastructure needed to yield sustained 
struggle of the sign‑carrying and demonstrating type is usually available 
only where there are other goods and services. But there is also the sort of 
terrorism that does not manifest itself so much in short bursts, as in long‑
term, continuous attempts at damage. Consider the following description 
of damage done by Boko Haram in Nigeria in the recent past, as articulated 
in a recent issue of The Economist:
The marks of terrorist rule start to appear a couple of hundred kilometres north 
of Yola, capital of Nigeria’s Adamawa state. Bombed churches and burned‑out 
political offices sit decaying in Hong, one of the most southern towns taken by 
Boko Haram.4 
 
The siege of this area by Boko is clearly a long‑term effort; despite 
some episodes of sporadic violence, the terror clearly lies in the disruption 
of day to day activities. 
In other words, what is normally categorized as “terrorism” can take 
many forms, and not all of them are easily characterized. But as noted 
earlier, another important point is that – at least from the standpoint of 
some – many of these activities are simply political activities; indeed, many 
will claim that action along these lines is no different from NATO taking 
a stand on behalf of some other group. How can we differentiate between 
these sorts of acts, and what it is – if anything – that feminist theory can do 
to elucidate some of the conceptual problems that arise? 
4  “Reclaiming Nigeria after Boko Haram,” in The Economist. Vol. 417, No. 8962, Oct. 
31‑Nov. 6, 2015, p. 48. m.
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In a work that has received a great deal of attention, the journalist 
Moustafa Bayoumi details what it means to be Muslim American in current 
times, and writes about assumptions with respect to terrorism and Muslims 
in the United States since the 9/11 attacks.5 But remarkably, Bayoumi 
seems to assume, as many do, that it is completely clear what constitutes 
an act of terrorism, and this despite the fact that trying to challenge and 
fight stereotypes is the main focus of his work. In the Introduction to his 
work, he writes:
[T]he national security apparatus routinely invokes the fear of terrorism, 
implicitly or explicitly by Muslims, to assume ever‑expanding powers over 
American lives and to justify military intervention overseas. The image that 
the country is under siege by these Muslim terrorists and their sympathizers is 
regularly reinforced….6
All of the examples provided by Bayoumi as constitutive of terrorism 
– and many have nothing to do with any sort of conception of Islam – 
involve death or injury.7 Perhaps this alone (and here we may want to count 
attempts at death or injury, but at this point things become somewhat vague) 
can help us to fill in the blanks on the notion of terror. Given that these 
examples and lines of argument are now crucially important in a number 
of places across the globe, we need both to do more conceptual work on the 
issues, and to see if other lines of analysis may be of assistance. 
Some have alleged that demonstrations having to do with matters 
ecological, for example, have had a tendency to turn violent; whether this 
is actually the case is probably debatable, but given the notion that there 
is such a thing as “ecoterror,” it is worth examination. In ecology, recent 
moves for the past several decades have already alluded to feminist theory, 
and there has been a tendency to advert to such theory as decisive of a 
number of lines of argument. Here we can take ecology as a model, and ask 
ourselves how feminist theory can affect our thinking on terrorism. 
If feminism, in its guise as care theory, asks us for more compassion, 
could it possibly be of assistance with these issues?
5 Moustafa Bayoumi, This Muslim American Life. New York: NYU Press, 2015. A blurb 
on the back of the book notes that Bayoumi is “a sane voice” and offers “thoughtful 
commentary.”
6 Ibid., pp. 11‑12.
7  I am citing examples from the Introduction to his work, pp. 1‑19. For the sake of 
statistical analysis, he makes the point that most cases of “terrorism” in the U.S. since 
9/11have nothing to do with Muslims.
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2.
Terrorism, as a set of politically‑conscious and socially‑charged acts, 
might be thought of as a response to other issues. That this is very much 
the case is highlighted by the view, current at least in the United States, 
that much of what is termed “terrorism” currently on the international 
scene has its origins as a reply to other acts of violence committed against 
developing nations or areas. A great deal of commentary, much of it 
extremely controversial, took place after the 9/11 incidents and gave rise 
to an outlook that blamed the United States, at least in part, for these very 
acts.8 In other words, on this interpretation, terrorist acts are spawned by 
the repeated misuse of resources in the developing world, and the repeated 
failure to respect the inhabitants of these areas. 
Whether this line of argument holds water is open to debate, but it is 
important to note that feminist concerns about issues such as immigration 
and work for peace have long maintained that much needs to be done in 
the way of education toward improving awareness of other cultures and of 
cultural constructs.9 Part of this, or so it has been argued, has something to 
do with an ethics of care – if we took a more compassionate, personalized 
view of what was going on around us, we might be able to respond in ways 
that were more beneficial to those who were the objects or recipients of our 
attitudes. Some have maintained that an ethics of care can be developed 
without advertence to feminist thought, but there is no question that such 
theory has been at the core of many or most debates about a different sort 
of ethics. 
The original impetus for much of what now falls under the “care” 
rubric has to do with the impact that was made by the work of Carol 
Gilligan. Although it might seem unnecessary to recount it, Gilligan’s 
work focused on the notion that there were tendencies (sometimes the 
emphasis on the notion of “tendency” has been overlooked) in lines of 
reasoning shown by adolescent females and males having to do with 
ethical matters.10 She found that what she termed the “care” voice seemed 
to be linked more frequently to girls, and the “justice” voice to boys. In 
any case, her work spawned an enormous effort at demarcating a notion 
of ethics that, in contradistinction to both the classical deontological lines 
8 One example is that of Ward Churchill, who lost his academic job and was involved 
in an extensive court case partly on the basis of his having written, with respect to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, that “some people fight back.”
9 See Feminist Analyses of Applied Ethics. Totowa, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
10 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
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and the consequentialist lines, hinged on the concept of personalizing care 
and care obligations. The upshot of much of this work has been to ask 
us to examine all of our relationships – of whatever sort, including for 
example, our relationships to potential immigrants – in a new guise, that of 
whether or not we are responding to persons on an individualized or semi‑
individualized basis.11
Lines of argument have been adduced in a variety of places that 
attempt to tie treatment of immigrants and the general global migration 
problem to terrorism. In other words, part of what drives individuals to 
commit terrorist acts – or so the argument would go – is a lack of hospitality 
in the new land, or a sense that the population represented by the terrorists 
is being attacked by larger forces. In this sense, new work on the ethics of 
care can provide us with a platform or springboard from which to theorize 
about how different modes of interacting with those from different cultures 
might ameliorate some of the current problems. This is especially the case 
with regard to those who feel compelled, for what they claim are religious 
reasons, to strike back.
One might want to make the argument, then, that care has a place 
in all of the debates about the “other,” and that notions of “otherness” are, 
of course, linked to at least some acts of terrorism. The difficulty is that 
we tend to engage in these care‑related virtues only with persons who are 
known to us, or who at least seem to be tied to us in some way. 
But we need to try to inculcate a view that sees all of us as part of 
a network requiring care. Virginia Held writes, with respect to these con‑
cerns:
The ethics of care clearly implies that society must recognize its responsibilities 
to its children and others who are dependents, enabling the best possible 
bringing up and educating of its future generations, appropriate responses to 
its members in need of health care, and assistance with the care of dependents. 
It clearly implies that the members of wealthy societies must recognize their 
responsibilities to alleviate the hunger and gross deprivations in care afflicting 
so many members of poor ones.12
The point that Held is making here is that our overall moral obliga‑
tions to assist—especially in what is known as the “Global South”—have 
11 For work in this area, see fn. 8.
12 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 159‑
‑160.
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a great deal to do with possible efforts to stem terrorism, or the types of 
political movements that give rise to it. If terrorism feeds off of a sense that 
certain groups have been oppressed (and history tells us that in formerly 
colonial areas, for instance, this is definitely an issue), then one of the steps 
that we can take to try to prevent the spread of terrorism has a great deal to 
do with a strengthened sense of compassion. 
Why be concerned about compassion and global response? There 
is some evidence, especially with regard to some of the recent terrorist at‑
tacks that are deemed to be “jihadist,” that much of the activity fueling the 
attacks revolves around a perception that the culture or cultures in question 
are held in disrepute in the West, and that Westerners are trying to damage 
these cultures, or even specific geographical areas.13 One might be tempt‑
ed to term the entire group of events surrounding many of the attacks a 
vicious circle; no sooner does an attack occur than the calls for retaliation 
begin, driving further terrorist activity, and so on. Again, Bayoumi, writ‑
ing from the vantage point of living in the United States, indicates how 
uncomfortable Muslim Americans feel with the rise in the level of rhetoric 
in recent years:
Does this mean that the United States is an Islamophobic country? Of course 
not. Large support for American Muslims exists in many quarters. Polls may 
suggest that about half the population is anti‑Muslim, but that leaves about half 
that isn’t.14
All of the information that we have suggests that terrorism is born 
of certain specific needs, and there is no denying that some of those 
needs have to do with the interpersonal, and may not be political—or 
religious—in any meaningful sense. The question then becomes: how do 
we address issues at an earlier point, so that the motivation for terrorism 
does not arise? It is too simplistic and disheartening to think that there is 
no point in looking at the matter from this perspective, as this fails to take 
into account that the changing or altering of even one planned attack is a 
worthy endeavor. Some of what has transpired in political movements in 
the developed countries may be of help here. 
13  As this is written, attacks have occurred in both France and Mali. Continuous media 
reporting indicates that what is perceived as a lack of respect or outright dislike for the 
cultures in question is driving the attacks.
14  Bayoumi, Muslim American, p. 146.
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3.
Writing in his work Practical Ethics, Peter Singer tells us about a 
very intriguing set of circumstances having to do with ecological activism:
In 1976…Bob Brown rafted down the Franklin River in Tasmania’s South‑
west. The wild beauty of the river…impressed him deeply…. Brown gave up 
his medical practice and founded the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, with the 
object of protecting the state’s remaining wilderness areas….[The Wilderness 
Society] organized a non‑violent blockade [of a road being built to a proposed 
dam site]. In 1982, Brown…was arrested and jailed for four days….15
As it happened, Brown’s activities – and those with whom he was 
working – were deemed by some to have crossed the line into “ecoterror‑
ism.” What happened here is instructive, because it provides a model for us 
of what leads some activists to move from comparatively peaceful demon‑
strating to something larger. 
Those who worked with Brown – and some comparatively recent 
demonstrators who engaged in “tree sitting” near the University of Califor‑
nia at Berkeley to protest a new building – did not hesitate to throw items, 
obstruct movement, toss paint, and so forth. It was alleged, at least in the 
case of the Berkeley students, that some went further than that. Although 
these cases are not similar, in their severity, to international incidents, they 
are intriguing examples. 
However one chooses to think of the path that leads to terrorism, one 
point seems to become clear – the activities that normally fall under that 
rubric tend to be engaged in when those who are making the relevant de‑
cisions feel that other paths are closed to them. Although ecological work 
might seem to be an example that is somewhat outside the scope of things, 
it is a better examplar than might initially be believed, because what we 
standardly take as ecologically progressive work is generally peaceful, and 
much of it might be deemed to be educative. In other words, or so the 
argument would go, if it can be shown that leafletting, demonstrating and 
“tree‑hugging” have often turned into something that resulted in property 
destruction or personal injury, it is not too difficult to see how other sorts 
of causes might become the focus of terrorist activity at a much earlier 
point. With respect to the international scene, the sheer intransigence of 
bargainers at a negotiating table may have a great deal to do with how it is 
that causes turn violent.
15  Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 257‑
‑258.
119Political Acts and Terrorism: A New Analysis
One might wonder what difference could be made, if any, in terms 
of the sorts of acts of terrorism driving global concern at the moment, but 
there is no question that an interesting fact emerges with respect, for exam‑
ple, to the “jihadists.” It has been pointed out again and again that most of 
those who have engaged in acts of terrorism are actually persons of ances‑
try other than European (and in some few cases, they are European) who 
have grown up in First World countries, but who have become infuriated 
by the behavior exhibited toward them, and what they regard as the intol‑
erance of the West.16 A line of argument can be adduced – and many have 
tried to create arguments to this effect—that what transpires in the more 
developed countries is causing an attitudinal shift among the children of 
immigrants that is, in fact, leading to violence.
Although it might seem somewhat recondite to try to bring object 
relations theory to bear on this situation, one aspect of that theorizing – 
employed at least implicitly by Gilligan, Dinnerstein and others – is that 
the breaking away of the male from the mother figure at an early age has a 
great deal to do with male development.17 When the young male comes to 
understand that he must “other” the female figures in his life, he typically 
also understands that core male attributes of dominance and aggression
are at his disposal. For many members of first World societies,
the male behavior that is required can be displayed in the classroom, the 
marketplace or the business world. But for members of marginalized 
groups, there may be no easy way to display the sorts of attributes that 
being a male seems to require. Thus, although it may seem strained, there 
is reason to believe that at least some Freudian‑derived theory may have 
something to do with the sorts of cultural tropes that are undertaken by 
males in groups that feel the need to express themselves as fighting back 
against the dominant group. The question is: how, if at all, can this tenden‑
cy be overcome?
The second wave of feminism brought with it many cultural moves 
to try to inculcate “sensitivity” into the young male adolescent, or to try to 
make it clear to growing boys that there was more than one way to be male. 
Although some might find these early efforts laughable, in the developed 
nations there is now a boom in careful parenting by fathers, gender‑neutral 
16  These concerns are relevant to the activities described in fn. 12.
17  In addition to Gilligan, see also the work of Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the 
Minotaur. New York: Harper and Row, 1978, and Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction 
of Mothering. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
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toys, and other cultural tropes that signal that there is greater acceptance of 
new norms for “manliness.” All of this – and in addition, a greater aware‑
ness of what is meant by “gender,” as across‑the‑board cultural changes 
have shown – may be of some assistance in showing us how a more car‑
ing culture can alter the patterns that lead to alienation, frustration, and 
eventually terrorism. If it is the case that a sort of anomie is responsible 
for much of the growth in terror that is being manifested in the developed 
nations, there is an argument to be made that attention to the work of femi‑
nist theorists helps to show the way in altering that alienated space and the 
concomitants of it. 
In the developing world, village life is still very much the norm, and 
although much has been written about the difficulties of village life on a 
day‑to‑day basis – lack of water, land‑right problems, and so forth – it is 
still the case that in small villages there is a coherence between family and 
friends that is often lacking in other parts of the globe, or, for that matter, 
even in urban areas of developing nations. It may very well be this sense 
of coherence and focus that presents part of the difficulty for families from 
the less developed nations when they move into the industrialized coun‑
tries. The sense of alienation and frustration is compounded by the usual 
difficulties, but it does not help any that the social media and various other 
forms of communication are even more pronounced in these areas, thus 
making the adjustment more difficult. 
Feminist theory often invokes an ethics of care, as we have said, 
and that ethics may help us in deciphering ways to try to reduce the sense 
of helplessness, frustration and anger that seems to drive acts of terrorism, 
even as we of the blame these acts almost solely on political or religious 
factors. Just as a sense of caring for the individual may alter our stance on 
immigration issues – and photos, descriptive stories, and so forth can be 
of great assistance here – a sense of care can also assist our communities 
in developing the sorts of social networks that alleviate, at least to some 
extent, the stress that drives acts of terror. 
4. 
I have been arguing that contemporary analyses of terrorism – and 
of the place of minority cultures in certain communities, which according 
to some is one of the drivers of terrorism – can be assisted by advertence 
to feminist theory, specifically feminist ethics. Citing Bayoumi and Peter 
Singer, the argument has been that those who feel displaced in the devel‑
oped world societies frequently are moved to commit violent acts, and that 
an ethics of care has something to say along these lines. 
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As Bayoumi has argued in This Muslim American Life, although it 
may very well be the case that many or most Americans are not anti‑Mus‑
lim, it still leaves a large group of Americans who probably are.18 Attitudes 
against a group may be displayed in a number of ways, and increasingly 
today counselors and others are using the term “microaggression” to dis‑
cuss how hostility, rudeness and a sort of general anger can be displayed 
to individuals even without the posting of hate signs or the more overtly 
demonstrative moves against a group that have taken place in various cul‑
tures. When we think about the work on taking the more personalized no‑
tions of care that apply to almost all familial or close human relations and 
applying them to others – as Held, for one, suggests – we can come to some 
conclusions about how a feminist ethics of care has something to offer first 
world societies that are concerned about terrorism. 
It represents an intriguing intersection with our earlier mention of 
work in ecology that ecofeminism and its various offshoots also have 
something to teach us in this regard. In other words, just as some of what 
Earth First! and other organizations have done with respect, for example, 
to the logging industry probably smacks of ecoterrorism, the care that we 
should show for our planet – at least according to some theorists – has 
something to do with the notion of individualized care.19 What is meant 
by this sort of “whole planet” thinking is that we need to act as if the very 
planet itself were our neighbor, and we need to do this in a way that makes 
for a difference in our daily actions. So, too, do we need to incorporate an 
ethics of care into our notions of action toward others, even those others 
who belong to groups or causes in which we ourselves do not believe. In‑
deed, some activism current in our daily life is making use of some of these 
notions; those who have argued, for example, that the Confederate flag, or 
portions of it, needs to be removed from state flags, from buildings, and so 
forth, are making the argument that there is a certain hostility in the use of 
these symbols, and that that hostility needs to stop. 
We recognize acts of terrorism when we see them, but we often have 
difficulty obtaining any notion of what it is that drives individuals to such 
acts, or how we ourselves might engage in behavior that would discourage 
the need for the acts. Feminist theory enjoins us to think in terms that, at 
least to some extent, revive the old virtue ethics of previous times. Al‑
18  As we have seen, Bayoumi is very specific about this.
19  For an indigenous view that, according to many, has ramifications that can be used by 
ecological activists, see Steven Hirst, I am the Grand Canyon: the Story of the Havasu-
pai People. Grand Canyon, AZ: Grand Canyon Association, 2006.
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though the ancients may have tried to inculcate magnanimity, for instance, 
we can go a step further and think of the care that we exhibit to small chil‑
dren as being exemplary of the care that we ought to exhibit to everyone, 
insofar as is possible. What we are attempting to envision is a society in 
which individual caring precludes the response to hate, implicit or other‑
wise, that leads to terror. 
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